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The Hours are Long: Unreasonable 
Delay After Jordan 
Palma Paciocco* 
All I know is that the hours are long, under these conditions, and 
constrain us to beguile them with proceedings which – how shall I say 
– which may at first sight seem reasonable, until they become a habit.  
– Samuel Beckett, Waiting for Godot (1954) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In its most recent case on the section 11(b) Charter right to be tried 
within a reasonable time,1 R. v. Jordan, the Supreme Court of Canada 
invoked “the familiar maxim: ‘Justice delayed is justice denied.’”2 
Marshall McLuhan once ventured a characteristically maverick rejoinder 
to that particular old chestnut: “Whereas convictions depend on speed-
ups, justice requires delay.”3 In reality, both aphorisms hit upon 
important truths about our criminal justice system. Taken together, they 
underscore the importance of carefully calibrating the right to be tried 
within a reasonable time.  
As criminal cases drag on, penological goals are undermined; 
presumptively innocent accused persons are left languishing in pre-trial 
                                                                                                                       
* Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University. I am grateful to 
Professors Benjamin Berger and Sonia Lawrence for organizing the 20th Annual Constitutional Cases 
Conference at Osgoode Hall Law School and for editing the present volume, and to all those who assisted 
them in these endeavours; to the many participants at the Constitutional Cases Conference, especially 
Professor Steve Coughlan, for their valuable feedback, insightful questions, and engaging conversation; 
to Professor François Tanguay-Renaud and the students in his Winter 2017 Criminal Procedure course 
for their stimulating comments and questions during a guest lecture I gave on R. v. Jordan; and to an 
anonymous reviewer for very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
1 Section 11(b) of the Charter states: “Any person charged with an offence has the right … 
to be tried within a reasonable time”: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter 
“Charter”]. 
2 [2016] S.C.J. No. 27, 2016 SCC 27, at para. 19 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Jordan”]. 
3 Marshallmcluhan.com, online: <https://marshallmcluhan.com/mcluhanisms/>. 
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detention or under restrictive bail conditions; victims and witnesses are 
further traumatized; evidence deteriorates; and the public loses faith in  
the criminal justice system.4 At the same time, excessive speed poses  
its own threat to the integrity of the criminal justice system: a rapid, 
“conveyor belt” approach to meting out justice hardly inspires public 
confidence, as illustrated by widespread antipathy towards rote plea-
bargaining.5 Moreover, many of the rights of accused persons take 
considerable time to vindicate.6 In this light, finding the ideal balance 
between speed-up and delay is a challenging task. The task is all the more 
daunting when we factor in the decidedly non-ideal conditions that 
characterize our criminal justice system, most notably chronic resource 
limitations. Crowns, judges, and court staff are overtaxed.7 Habitual 
underfunding of legal aid programs results in a large number of self-
represented litigants whose cases often take longer to process.8 Outmoded 
technologies and insufficient technical support in courtrooms further 
exacerbate the problem.9 If haste makes waste, dearth makes delay. 
Jordan represents the Court’s most recent attempt to strike an ideal 
balance in decidedly non-ideal circumstances. The case was close and 
controversial. A bare majority overturned the existing law and introduced 
a new section 11(b) framework. That framework is both promising and 
problematic. It is the focus of the present article. Part II of this article 
                                                                                                                       
4 See, generally “Delaying Justice is Denying Justice”: Report of the Standing Senate 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (August 2016), online: <https://sencanada.ca/content/ 
sen/committee/421/LCJC/reports/CourtDelaysStudyInterimReport_e.pdf> [hereinafter “Delaying Justice 
is Denying Justice”]. 
5 S. Bibas, The Machinery of Criminal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
at xvi. 
6 Justice Cromwell makes precisely this point in his concurring reasons in Jordan, supra, 
note 2, at para. 150.  
7 “Delaying Justice is Denying Justice”, supra, note 4, at 8. To some extent, Crowns’ 
excessive workloads are self-inflicted. Crown attorneys sometimes make the discretionary decision 
to move forward with prosecutions in minor cases where criminal sanctions are arguably not 
warranted, or where diversionary processes would be more productive. Some Crowns may, for 
example, abnegate their duty to make careful charging decisions because they over-rely on the 
recommendations of police officers when deciding which cases to pursue. The Honourable  
M. Rosenberg, “The Attorney General and the Administration of Criminal Justice” (2009), 34 Queen’s 
L.J. 813-862, at 829-30. For an argument that Crowns should be far more circumspect in pursuing 
prosecutions, see, e.g., M.-E. Sylvestre, “Rethinking Criminal Responsibility for Poor Offenders: Choice, 
Monstrosity, and the Logic of Practice” (2010) 55 McGill L.J. 771-817, at 811 and 814. 
8 Department of Justice Canada, “Legal Research Series: Court Site Study of Adult 
Unrepresented Accused in the Provincial Criminal Courts, Part 1: Overview Report” (2002) at 33, 
online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/ccs-ajc/rr03_la2-rr03_aj2/rr03_la2.pdf>. 
9 In R. v. J.M., [2017] O.J. No. 256, 2017 ONCJ 4 (Ont. C.J.), for example, unreasonable 
delay was partly caused by technical failures in the courtroom [hereinafter “J.M.”]. See also 
“Delaying Justice is Denying Justice”, supra, note 4, at 13-14. 
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offers a brief overview of the case law preceding Jordan. Part III 
explains the Jordan framework. Part IV critically assesses the central 
feature of that framework: a presumptive ceiling on reasonable delay. 
Part V addresses a second key feature: the removal of prejudice as an 
explicit factor in the section 11(b) analysis. Part VI concludes. 
II. THE ROAD TO JORDAN 
To understand why the Jordan majority felt the need to reinvent 
section 11(b), it is helpful to survey some of the case law that came 
before. Between 1986 and 1989, the Supreme Court of Canada issued 
several section 11(b) decisions in which it established a flexible 
balancing test for section 11(b) claims10 but struggled to converge on a 
decisive list of factors to be weighed.11 In 1989, in R. v. Smith, the Court 
issued its first unanimous section 11(b) decision and affirmed four 
factors: the length of the delay; the reason for the delay; defence waiver; 
and prejudice to the accused.12 The Court acknowledged ongoing 
disagreement among its members as to how those factors should be 
interpreted and balanced, with particular disagreement about prejudice. 
The following year, it addressed section 11(b) yet again in a decision 
that was to become notorious in Canadian jurisprudence: R. v. Askov.13 
Prior to Askov, the Court’s section 11(b) cases had all involved delays 
that were unusually long relative to the average timelines in their own 
jurisdictions. In Askov, by contrast, the complaint was that the delay was 
unjustified despite being in line with local practice.14 To adjudicate this 
claim, the majority compared the delays in Peel District, where Askov 
originated, to those in other jurisdictions. It did so on the basis of the 
evidence presented by the parties together with data collected on its own 
initiative after oral argument.15 This comparison led the majority to 
                                                                                                                       
10 R. v. Mills, [1986] S.C.J. No. 39, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mills”]; R. v. 
Rahey, [1987] S.C.J. No. 23, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Conway, [1989] S.C.J. No. 70, 
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Conway”].  
11 J.F.R. Levesque, “Trial Within a Reasonable Time” (1988) 31 Crim. L.Q. 55, 55; and see 
Conway, id., at 1673. 
12 R. v. Smith, [1989] S.C.J. No. 119, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (S.C.C.). 
13 R. v. Askov, [1990] S.C.J. No. 106, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Askov”]. 
14 S.G. Coughlan, “R. v. Askov – A Bold Step Not Boldly Taken” (1991) 33 Crim. L.Q. 247 
[hereinafter “Coughlan, ‘A Bold Step’”]. 
15 C. Baar, “Court Delay as Social Science Evidence: The Supreme Court of Canada and 
‘Trial Within a Reasonable Time’” (1997) 19:2 Justice System Journal 123, at 133 [hereinafter 
“Baar, ‘Court Delay’”]. 
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conclude that the average delays in Peel were indeed unreasonable.16 The 
Court, wrote: “Making a very rough comparison and more than doubling 
the longest waiting period to make every allowance for the special 
circumstances in Peel would indicate that a period of delay in a range of 
some six to eight months between committal and trial might be deemed to 
be the outside limit of what is reasonable.”17  
By now the fallout from Askov is legend. Numerous courts took very 
literally the admonishment that a six to eight-month delay may be 
unreasonable and immediately began to stay cases that surpassed that limit. 
In Ontario, where delay was especially bad, some 51,791 criminal charges 
were stayed, withdrawn, or dismissed in the 13 months following Askov.18 In 
a fascinating article, Professor Carl Baar, whose empirical work was relied 
on in Askov, explained that the Court did not foresee this result because it 
misinterpreted his data and because its supplementary research was flawed.19  
The Court acted quickly to staunch the flow of cases hemorrhaging 
out of the system, scheduling oral arguments in two pending section 
11(b) appeals.20 The lead judgment, Morin, emphasized that the guideline 
for institutional delay articulated in Askov was to be applied flexibly  
and contextually and adjusted to account for “local conditions” and 
“changing circumstances”.21 The Court established a parallel, eight to  
10-month guideline for provincial courts based on its findings that those 
courts have a heavier workload and take more time on average to dispose 
of cases.22 These findings were drawn from a voluminous record, but as 
reported by Baar, the Court once again misinterpreted the data.23  
                                                                                                                       
16 Askov, supra, note 13, at 1240. 
17 Id. 
18 Baar, “Court Delay”, supra, note 15, at 130. Some post-Askov analyses report that over 
47,000 charges were stayed or withdrawn in Ontario following the release of the judgment. That 
number is for the period from October 22, 1990 to September 6, 1991 and was reported in R. v. 
Morin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 25, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771, at 779 (S.C.C.), per Lamer C.J.C., dissenting but 
not on this point [hereinafter “Morin”].  
19 Baar, id., at 133. Baar notes, inter alia, that the Court seems to have mistakenly relied on 
data from 1984 that was no longer current, and which had in fact been presented to the Court by way 
of contrasting the average timeline for cases in 1984 with the more protracted timeline that had come 
to exist by the time Askov was decided a few years later. 
20 Carl Baar, “Social Facts, Court Delay and the Charter” in F.L. Morton, ed., Law, 
Politics, and the Judicial Process in Canada, 3d ed. (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2002),  
at 375, 381.  
21 Morin, supra, note 18, at 799-800. 
22 Id., at 799. 
23 Baar, “Court Delay”, supra, note 15, at 135. Baar notes, for example, that the Court based 
its guidelines for summary offence on information about indictable offences committed to trial  
following preliminary hearings, and that it conflated data on cases filed with data on cases  
pending, among other errors. 
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In practice, any empirical errors in Morin mattered far less than those in 
Askov, however, because Morin’s key implication was clear: “Morin sent 
a message – in what can only barely be described as subtext rather than 
text – that the right to a trial within a reasonable time did not matter.”24 
This message was conveyed with particular force through the Court’s 
comments on the prejudice factor. The Court affirmed that “prejudice to 
the accused can be inferred from prolonged delay”, but in the very same 
paragraph opined that “many, perhaps most, accused are not anxious to 
have an early trial”.25 The effect, according to Steve Coughlan, “was a 
decade and a half in which successful section 11(b) claims were rare.”26  
In 2009, in R. v. Godin, a unanimous Court “made an attempt to 
reverse that result” by underscoring that section 11(b) claims should not 
hinge on evidence of specific prejudice.27 The Court also tried to 
discourage “micro-counting” — the process of assiduously parsing out 
every discrete source of delay that had come to characterize section 11(b) 
analyses — insisting on the importance of not “los[ing] sight of the forest 
for the trees”.28 Despite these clarifications, lower courts continued to 
engage in the painstaking process of taxonimizing and tallying every 
single source of delay; a process that the Jordan majority described as 
“the bane of every trial judge’s existence.”29 Some courts also continued, 
rather absurdly, to seek evidence of inferred prejudice, and to dismiss 
cases for lack of prejudice.30 These two trends were front-of-mind when 
the Court heard Jordan. 
III. R. V. JORDAN 
Barrett Richard Jordan, together with nine co-accused, was charged with 
a number of drug-related offences. His case took just under 50 months  
to wend its way through the system. During that time, he spent two  
months in custody and nearly four years under restrictive bail conditions. 
For 15 months during the latter period, he was under a conditional 
                                                                                                                       
24 S. Coughlan, “R. v. Jordan: A Dramatically New Approach to Trial Within a Reasonable 
Time” (2016) 29 C.R. (7th) 311 [hereinafter “Coughlan, ‘A Dramatically New Approach’”]. 
25 Morin, supra, note 18, at 801. 
26 Coughlan, “A Dramatically New Approach”, supra, note 24. 
27 Id.; R. v. Godin, [2009] S.C.J. No. 26, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 30-31 and 38 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Godin”]. 
28 Godin, id., at para. 18. See Coughlan, “A Dramatically New Approach”, supra, note 24. 
29 Jordan, supra, note 2, at para. 37. 
30 Id., at para. 200 (per Cromwell J., concurring); Coughlan, “A Dramatically New 
Approach”, supra, note 24. 
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sentencing order following a conviction for unrelated drug charges.  
Jordan brought a section 11(b) application for a stay of proceedings,  
which was dismissed. He was convicted of five drug-related charges.  
In analyzing Jordan’s section 11(b) claim, the trial judge found that 
his case took 49.5 months to complete, of which 32.5 months were 
attributable to institutional delay. The judge held that, while this period 
was well beyond the Morin guidelines, institutional delay should be 
given less weight than Crown delay in the balancing analysis. He held, 
further, that because much of the delay coincided with Jordan’s 15-month 
conditional sentence, the prejudicial effect on Jordan’s liberty and 
security interests was reduced. The Court of Appeal for British Columbia 
denied Jordan’s appeal. Jordan appealed to the Supreme Court, where he 
objected to how the trial judge had weighed institutional delay and to the 
trial judge’s treatment of prejudice.31 In response, a slim majority of the 
Supreme Court undertook a complete overhaul of the section 11(b) case 
law, establishing a new standard that relies less on distinctions among 
types of delay, and which dispenses with the prejudice factor altogether. 
It recently affirmed this new standard in R. v. Cody.32 
The central feature of the new framework is a ceiling on how much 
time can presumptively elapse between charging and the end of trial:  
18 months for provincial court cases; and 30 months for cases in superior 
court or for those tried in provincial court following a preliminary 
inquiry. If a trial is not concluded (or is not expected to be concluded) 
within that period, then the delay is presumptively unreasonable. The 
charges must therefore be stayed unless the Crown can establish that the 
delay was justified. If a trial is concluded within that time period (or if it 
is expected to be), then the delay is presumptively reasonable. The onus 
then falls on the defence to prove otherwise.  
As under the previous law, a court faced with a section 11(b) challenge 
must begin by calculating the total period of delay from charging through to 
the actual or anticipated end of trial. This period does not include “defence 
delay”: delay that is unequivocally waived by the defence; or delay caused 
solely by defence conduct that is not “legitimately taken to respond to the 
charges”.33 Having identified the total period of delay and deducted any 
defence delay, the court can readily determine whether the complained-of 
delay falls above or below the ceiling.  
                                                                                                                       
31 Appellant’s Factum, Barrett Richard Jordan v. Her Majesty the Queen (File No. 36068), at 20. 
32 [2017] S.C.J. No. 31, 2017 SCC 31 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cody”]. 
33 Jordan, supra, note 2, at paras. 61, 191 and 65. 
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If the ceiling is breached, then the onus falls on the Crown to show the 
delay was reasonable by virtue of “exceptional circumstances”. Exceptional 
circumstances have two features: they are either reasonably unforeseen or 
reasonably unavoidable; and once they arise, the Crown cannot reasonably 
remedy the resultant delay. Exceptional circumstances need not be rare.34 
They generally fall into one of two categories.35 The first, “discrete events”, 
are isolated incidents like medical emergencies or a complainant’s 
unexpected recantation. A period of delay that is attributed to a discrete 
event must be subtracted from the total delay. If the remaining delay still 
falls above the ceiling, then a stay must be entered; if it does not, then the 
onus shifts to the accused to show the delay was nevertheless 
unreasonable.36 The second category of exceptional circumstances is 
“particularly complex cases”: cases in which the evidence or the issues 
demand an unusual amount of preparation or trial time. If the delay is 
justified by virtue of the case’s complexity, then ipso facto it is not 
unreasonable and no stay issues.37 Exceptional circumstances are the only 
basis upon which the Crown can justify a presumptively unreasonable 
delay; it cannot rely on chronic institutional delay, the gravity of the 
offence, or the absence of prejudice.38 
If the ceiling is not breached, then it falls to the defence to 
demonstrate unreasonableness. To do so, the defence must show that “it 
took meaningful steps to demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the 
proceedings” and that “the case took markedly longer than it reasonably 
should have.”39 When considering whether a case took markedly longer 
than it reasonably should have, a court should “adopt a bird’s-eye view 
of the case” rather than engaging in “micro-counting”.40 The majority 
voiced an expectation that “stays beneath the ceiling [are] to be rare, and 
limited to clear cases.”41  
Finally, recognizing that institutional actors need time to remedy 
chronic institutional delay, and insisting that the justice system cannot 
afford a repeat of Askov, the majority introduced a transitional 
framework for cases already in the system when Jordan was released. 
Jordan applies to those cases, but with two caveats. First, where the 
                                                                                                                       
34 Id., at para. 69. 
35 Id., at para. 71. 
36 Id., at paras. 71-76. 
37 Id., at paras. 77-80. 
38 Id., at para. 81. 
39 Id., at para. 82. 
40 Id., at para. 91. 
41 Id., at para. 48. 
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ceiling is breached, the Crown may be able to justify the delay “based on 
the parties’ reasonable reliance on the law as it previously existed.”42 
Second, where the delay falls below the ceiling, considerations of 
whether the defence took steps to move the case along, and of whether 
the case took markedly longer than was reasonably required, are to be 
applied contextually, again in recognition of the fact that the parties had 
been operating without notice of the Jordan standard.43  
IV. THE JORDAN CEILING 
Writing on behalf of himself and three others, Cromwell J. 
(concurring) listed several objections to the new framework,44 which he 
described as “wrong in principle and unwise in practice.”45 He would 
have refined the existing law instead of overhauling it.  
Justice Cromwell’s first objection was that “the ceilings substitute a 
right for ‘trial under the ceiling[s]’ ... for the constitutional right to be 
tried within a reasonable time.”46 In response, the majority emphasized 
that the ceiling does not obviate a reasonableness analysis; rather, it 
allocates the burden of proof for purposes of that very analysis.47 Even 
so, Cromwell J.’s objection has merit in light of the “anchoring effect”. 
By virtue of this well-known heuristic — “a ubiquitous phenomenon in 
human judgment”48 — people presented with a number that is meant to 
serve as a reference point predictably fixate on the number and do not 
adjust up or down enough to rationally account for context-specific 
information.49 The ceiling is likely to have precisely this effect: judges 
may come to equate “unreasonable delay” with delay surpassing 18 or  
30 months, regardless of individual case factors. The effect may be 
especially strong in cases of delay falling below the ceiling, since the 
                                                                                                                       
42 Id., at para. 96. 
43 Id. at para. 99. 
44 This article addresses three of these objections. The others are: that the ceilings may 
result in thousands of cases being stayed; that they do not actually simplify the law; and that an 
overhaul of the jurisprudence was unnecessary given that the Court unanimously agreed the appeal 
could readily be decided on the basis of the prior law. Id., at para. 147. 
45 Id., at para. 302. 
46 Id., at para. 147 (citation omitted). 
47 Id., at paras. 51 and 58. 
48 A. Furnham & H. Chu Boo, “A Literature Review of the Anchoring Effect” (2011) 40 
The Journal of Socio-Economics 35, at 35. 
49 S. Bibas, “Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial” 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2463 at  
2515-17 (2004). 
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majority’s insistence that such cases will only rarely be stayed should 
make judges especially wary of departing from the presumption.50 
Arguably, the ceiling actually depends upon the anchoring effect. Its 
purpose is to unsettle and recalibrate judges’ valuations of unreasonable 
delay. For it to have this result, judges must take seriously the presumption 
that delay above the ceiling is unreasonable even if it is common in their 
localities. If they do not, then Jordan will turn out as Morin did.51 
According to one Jordan intervener, the Criminal Lawyers’ Association of 
Ontario (“the Association”), complacency about delay “can be traced to the 
Morin decision and the signal it sent that the right to a trial within a 
‘reasonable time’ contemplates endless flexibility.”52 A loose balancing test 
unmoored from a stable presumptive standard can lead judges to use their 
localized expectations as anchors. Like the proverbial slow-boiling frog, 
they can thereby come to normalize ever-increasing periods of delay.  
Recognizing this phenomenon, the Association pushed for a 
presumptive ceiling, stating: “Boundless flexibility is incompatible with 
the concept of a Charter right”.53 As a general rule, this statement must 
be correct: a right is more valuable to the extent that it has specific, 
authoritative content; and a putative right with no stable content is 
illusory. Yet, while the idea of a clear ex ante standard for section 11(b) 
claims is appealing, it is hard to translate into practice. How can a court 
fix on a universal ceiling that will reduce delay across diverse cases 
without provoking a tidal wave of stays? This question brings us to 
Cromwell J.’s second and third objections: “creating these types of 
ceilings is a task better left to legislation”; and “the ceilings are not 
supported by the record or by [the majority’s] analysis of the last 10 years 
of s. 11(b) jurisprudence and have not been the subject of adversarial 
debate.”54 I will take up each objection in turn.  
The notion that establishing ceilings “is a task better left to legislation” 
is animated by the fact that trial management is a quintessentially 
polycentric issue.55 In Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship 
                                                                                                                       
50 Jordan, supra, note 2, at para. 83. 
51 Morin, supra, note 18. 
52 R. v. Jordan (File No. 36068), Factum of Intervener, Criminal Lawyers’ Association 
(Ontario) at paras. 8-10. 
53 Id., at para. 12. The Association did not propose a particular number but merely endorsed 
the ceiling-based approach in principle. 
54 Jordan, supra, note 2, at para. 147. 
55 L.L. Fuller, “Adjudication and the Rule of Law” (1960) 54 Proceedings of the American 
Society of International Law and Its Annual Meeting (1921-1969) 1, citing M. Polanyi, The Logic of 
Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951) [hereinafter “Fuller”]. 
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and Immigration), Bastarache J. explained the concept of polycentricity as 
it relates to the division of labour between the judiciary and the other 
branches: 
[T]he broad principle of ‘polycentricity’ [is] well known to academic 
commentators who suggest that it provides the best rationale for judicial 
deference to non-judicial agencies. A ‘polycentric issue is one which 
involves a large number of interlocking and interacting interests and 
considerations’ (P. Cane, An Introduction to Administrative Law (3rd ed. 
1996), at p. 35). While judicial procedure is premised on a bipolar 
opposition of parties, interests, and factual discovery, some problems 
require the consideration of numerous interests simultaneously, and the 
promulgation of solutions which concurrently balance benefits and costs 
for many different parties. Where an administrative structure more closely 
resembles this model, courts will exercise restraint.56 
Lon L. Fuller, writing with Kenneth I. Winston, explains polycentricity 
using the image of a spider web: “each crossing of strands is a distinct 
center for distributing tensions” and “[a] pull on one strand will 
distribute tensions after a complicated pattern throughout the web as a 
whole”.57 Elsewhere, Fuller notes that polycentric problems can have 
rational solutions, but those solutions cannot be identified with reference 
to external or a priori principles; they must rather be located through a 
process of calibration whereby any one manoeuvre shifts the entire 
calculus.58 Court delay is a polycentric issue: it involves numerous 
stakeholders and could be addressed through multiple, non-exclusive 
reforms, each of which would reverberate through a complex web of 
governance within and beyond the criminal justice system.  
By establishing a presumptive ceiling on delay with the express 
purpose of incentivizing reform, the judiciary has effectively given 
marching orders to the other branches. Over two decades ago, writing 
about the Askov guidelines, Coughlan noted the objection that, “by 
requiring one jurisdiction to allocate the same level of resources as other 
jurisdictions, the court is stepping into the political arena. The decision 
amounts to saying that the Ontario Government is required to allocate 
fewer of its resources to health care and highways, and more to the 
justice system.”59 The same could be said of Jordan. Indeed, the majority 
                                                                                                                       
56 [1998] S.C.J. No. 46, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, at para. 36 (S.C.C.). 
57 L.L. Fuller & K.I. Winston, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92 Harv. L.  
Rev. 353 at 395. 
58 Fuller, supra, note 55, at 4. 
59 Coughlan, “A Bold Step, supra, note 14, at 250. 
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went so far as to suggest how various stakeholders could potentially go 
about reducing delay.60 If implemented, their suggestions would 
invariably vibrate throughout the metaphorical policy web in precisely 
the manner suggested by Coughlan’s analysis of Askov. The concern 
therefore arises: has the Court overstepped?  
In my view, this concern has limited merit. From a separation of 
powers perspective, it may be unsatisfactory that the Court should 
effectively obligate some jurisdictions to divert more resources towards 
their criminal justice systems so that courthouses in, say, Calgary and 
Charlottetown operate at relatively similar speeds. But, from a Charter 
perspective, it is utterly unsatisfactory that an accused’s section 11(b) 
right in Calgary should cash out as less valuable than her counterpart’s in 
Charlottetown — which is precisely the result when the term 
“unreasonable delay” is given starkly different interpretations across  
the country. In this light, it is not the Court’s decision to give concrete 
meaning to section 11(b) that constrains the other branches; it is  
section 11(b) itself. That is precisely the role of the Charter. Moreover, 
while executive and legislative choices are constrained by Jordan, they 
are by no means ordained. Jordan does not prescribe any specific  
policy response to delay, so much as make clear the consequence if  
none is forthcoming.  
Still, there is reason to be concerned that setting the ceiling is not an 
appropriate task for the judiciary — not because the courts should be chary 
of identifying clear constitutional limitations on polycentric executive and 
legislative decision-making, but because establishing a time frame for 
criminal trials requires a great deal of empirical research and analysis. 
Courts may not be well placed to undertake this type of analysis, for several 
reasons. First, courts rely heavily on the parties to gather and interpret 
empirical evidence, and the parties may compile records that are more or 
less complete. Second, many judges lack the methodological training 
necessary to independently evaluate and apply empirical data, much less 
supplement it through independent research.61 Ideally, the court would be 
able to rely on clear expert evidence about the import and reliability of the 
data on offer;62 but here again, judges are largely at the mercy of the parties, 
who determine which expert evidence, if any, to present. Third, the lack of 
                                                                                                                       
60 Jordan, supra, note 2, at para. 140. 
61 J. Lazare, “When Disciplines Collide: Polygamy and the Social Sciences on Trial” (2015) 
32 Windsor Y.B. Access to Just. 103, at 108 [hereinafter “Lazare”]. 
62 D. Paciocco, “Taking a ‘Goudge’ Out of Bluster and Blarney: An ‘Evidence-Based 
Approach’ to Expert Testimony” (2009) 13 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 135, at 149-50. 
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methodological expertise among many judges (and among many of the 
advocates charged with gathering and presenting empirical evidence, for 
that matter) may reflect essential divergences between “the objectives and 
values of the scientific enterprise and the legal culture” — including, most 
notably, the tension between the empiricist’s project of gathering evidence 
in order to reach a conclusion and the advocate’s project of gathering 
evidence in order to buttress a conclusion.63 These related factors 
complicate the use of empirical evidence by the courts, even as such 
evidence helps them to resolve legal disputes.  
All this brings us to Cromwell J.’s second objection: the ceiling is not 
sufficiently evidence-based.64 To assess this objection, it is helpful to 
consider how the majority set the ceiling. The majority explained that it 
took the Morin guidelines as its staring point and adjusted them upwards 
“to account for other factors that can reasonably contribute to the time it 
takes to prosecute a case” including “the inherent time requirements of 
the case and the increased complexity of criminal cases since Morin.”65 It 
also “conducted a qualitative review of nearly every reported s. 11(b) 
appellate decision from the past 10 years, and many decisions from trial 
courts.”66 While this account is helpful, it is far from complete.67 We can 
readily calculate that the majority increased the Morin guidelines by 
adding a further eight to 10 months for provincial court and 12 to 16 months 
for superior court, but it is not apparent how the majority generated those 
numbers. The scope and methodology of the majority’s “qualitative 
review” in particular is unclear.68  
Justice Cromwell observed that, in contrast, when the Court developed 
numerical guidelines in Askov and Morin, it did so on the basis of 
“extensive evidence including statistical information from comparable 
jurisdictions and expert opinion”.69 Notably, Baar — whose contributions to 
the Morin record Cromwell J. expressly cited as evidence of that record’s 
sufficiency70 — opined that the Askov Court went astray by trying to 
                                                                                                                       
63 Lazare, supra, note 61, at 103, 110-11. See also C. Nowlin, “Should Any Court Accept 
the ‘Social Authority’ Paradigm?” (2001) 14 Can. J.L. & Juris. 55.  
64 Jordan, supra, note 2, at para. 147. 
65 Id., at para. 53.  
66 Id., at para. 106. 
67 M. Spratt, “Expect Delays: Right to a Speedy Trial”, Michael Spratt Law Blog, July 19, 
2016, online: <http://www.michaelspratt.com/law-blog/expect-delays-right-to-a-speedy-trial>. 
68 According to Steve Coughlan, “The minority in Jordan notes correctly that the previous 
guidelines were based on extensive statistical and expert evidence: the presumptive ceilings seem to 
be best-guess ballpark figures.” Coughlan, “A Dramatically New Approach”, supra, note 24. 
69 Jordan, supra, note 2, at para. 281. 
70 Id. 
(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d) UNREASONABLE DELAY 245 
supplement the inadequate record through its own data-collection, while the 
Morin Court misinterpreted the evidence before it.71 If the Askov record was 
inadequate and the Morin record was misinterpreted, the Jordan record may 
well have been both. With respect to its adequacy, Benjamin Perrin has 
noted that the Court was “limited to information about case duration from 
provincial court in Surrey, B.C.”; yet a recent study he co-authored with 
Richard Audas reveals “wide variability in average case length across the 
provinces and territories, ranging from 63 days to 271 days.”72 With respect 
to the Court’s analysis, it is significant that, according to Baar, courts should 
adopt a number of practices to help them interpret and apply social science 
data correctly despite the sorts of challenges outlined above. First among 
these suggestions is that courts should “make full use of the adversary 
process. Courts undermine their own processes when they collect and 
consider social facts after oral argument without providing an opportunity 
for those facts to be tested.”73 The Jordan majority’s sua sponte post-
hearing review disregards this advice.  
At this juncture, it is still too early to know how the Jordan 
framework will play out in the long run. In practice, its effects are  
likely to vary across jurisdictions given the regional disparities reported 
by Perrin and Audas.74 Much will depend upon how different criminal 
justice actors react. Their reactions will doubtless be informed by the 
incentive structures put into place by Jordan. Those structures are shaped 
                                                                                                                       
71 Baar, “Court Delay”, supra, note 15, at 134-35. 
72 B. Perrin, “Victims of crime pay the real price for unreasonable delays” The Globe and 
Mail (February 20, 2017), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/victims-of-crime-pay-
the-real-price-of-unreasonable-delay/article34077444/>; B. Perrin & R. Audas, “Report Card on the 
Criminal Justice System: Evaluating Canada’s Justice Deficit”, Macdonald-Laurier Institute 
(September 2016), online: <http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/JusticeReportCard_F4.pdf> 
[hereinafter “Perrin & Audas”]. 
73 Baar, “Court Delay”, supra, note 15, at 136. Baar goes on to suggest (despite his “first lesson” 
about “mak[ing] full use of the adversary process”) that courts should also “avoid dependence on the 
adversary process”, which, when it comes to the presentation and digestion of empirical evidence, is only 
as good as the advocates and expert witnesses involved. He further suggests strategies for maximizing the 
value of expert testimony; and he proposes that lawyers should “develop practices and guidelines” to help 
them sort through and effectively present voluminous social science data. Baar, “Court Delay”, id., at  
136-39. See also Judge R.J. Williams, “Grasping a Thorny Baton… A Trial Judge Looks at Judicial Notice 
and Courts’ Acquisition of Social Science” (1996) 14 Can. Fam. L.Q. 179 (arguing that “any trial process 
should conform to basic due process requirements that allow the parties the opportunity to both present 
evidence and make submissions with respect to material put before the court (whether that material is 
coming from the parties, represented or unrepresented, or the court).”) Cf. J. Monahan & L. Walker, 
“Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law”, 134 U. Penn. L. Rev. 
477 at 497ff. (1986) (adopting a more sanguine and nuanced view of sua sponte research by judges). 
74 Perrin & Audas, supra, note 72, and accompanying text. 
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in part by the excision of prejudice as a factor in the section 11(b) 
analysis: the issue to which I now turn.  
V. WITHOUT PREJUDICE? 
One of Jordan’s two contentions before the Supreme Court of Canada 
was that the trial judge had erred in his assessment of prejudice. Prejudice 
has long been a contentious and confusing aspect of the section 11(b) 
analysis. It is uncontroversial that unreasonable delay is prejudicial to 
accused persons. Delay impacts liberty interests by extending time spent in 
custody or under bail conditions. It implicates security of the person insofar 
as criminal charges entail stress and anxiety; disruptions to family, work, 
and social life; financial strain; loss of privacy; and stigma. Delay can also 
undermine an accused person’s ability to make full answer and defence, 
since memories fade and evidence degrades over time.75 These sources of 
prejudice are now settled in the jurisprudence.76 The controversy is about 
how to incorporate them into the analysis so as to give due regard to the 
prejudice caused by trial delay without making section 11(b) claims 
conditional on the accused’s ability to prove concrete harm.  
In the first Supreme Court case on the issue, Mills, Lamer and Wilson JJ. 
espoused alternative views of prejudice that together helped shape the 
jurisprudence in this area. Justice Lamer (as he then was) would have 
excluded prejudice from the section 11(b) balancing analysis in favour of an 
“irrebuttable presumption that, as of the moment of the charge, the accused 
suffers a prejudice that the [section 11(b)] guarantee is aimed at limiting, and 
that the prejudice increases over time.”77 In his view, although “prejudice 
underlies the right”, “actual prejudice” should not matter to the assessment 
because its absence cannot negate the claim.78 In contrast, Wilson J. wrote:  
if delay has had the effect of impairing the accused’s ability to defend 
the charge, and he can establish the necessary causal connection, I 
cannot accede to the proposition that this is irrelevant in the assessment 
of reasonableness. It seems to me that it may provide an alternate basis 
of violation of the accused’s s. 11(b) right.79  
                                                                                                                       
75 See, e.g., Jordan, supra, note 2, at para. 20. 
76 In Mills, supra, note 10, Lamer J. (as he then was) would have excluded the right to make 
full answer and defence from consideration on the grounds that it is protected by other Charter rights 
(at 921-23), but the law is now settled against his position.  
77 Id., at 926. 
78 Id. 
79 Id., at para. 969. 
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Over time, both views were incorporated into the law to some extent. In 
Morin, the Court affirmed that prejudice could be inferred from the 
length of delay and that actual prejudice could also be established. The 
Court specified, however, that while prejudice could be inferred, this 
presumption was neither automatic nor irrebuttable. The holding that 
prejudice could be inferred in some cases but not others led to the 
quixotic search for evidence of inferred prejudice.80  
To remedy this confusion and reignite our commitment to timely trials, 
the Jordan majority essentially adopted Lamer J.’s position in Mills.  
An irrebuttable presumption of prejudice is now baked into the section 11(b) 
framework. That presumption informs the setting of the presumptive ceiling. 
Once the ceiling is breached, we presume that accused persons have suffered 
prejudice to their Charter-protected liberty, security of the person, and fair 
trial interests.81  
Thus, the accused no longer needs to demonstrate prejudice — and it 
appears the courts no longer have an avenue for considering it: prejudice 
“no longer play[s] an explicit role in the s. 11(b) analysis”.82 
There is much wisdom in establishing an irrebuttable presumption of 
prejudice following unreasonable delay. This presumption reflects an 
understanding that delay is not simply unreasonable to the extent that it 
harms the accused; rather, delay always harms the accused because the 
experience of being prosecuted is innately injurious. When the process 
drags on for too long, the accused is entitled to a remedy. This analysis is 
compelling, and it sidelines the cynical view that most accused persons 
favour delay. The inclusion of an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice 
within the Jordan framework is therefore welcome. 
The exclusion of actual prejudice from the Jordan framework is less 
welcome. It raises a couple of significant questions that will need to be 
addressed in future cases.83 First, under prior jurisprudence, prejudice was a 
key touchstone for assessing delay in cases of young offenders. It is well-
settled that timely trials are especially important for young persons given 
                                                                                                                       
80 See supra, note 30, and accompanying text. 
81 Jordan, supra, note 2, at para. 54. 
82 Id. Cf. Christopher Sherrin, observing that Jordan “does not specifically say whether the 
existence of prejudice can contribute to the conclusion that delay over a ceiling is not justified. One 
would assume that it could” but adding: “It is far from clear […] that prejudice can be considered 
when a court assesses whether a case is sufficiently complex that the delay is justified.” C. Sherrin, 
“Understanding and Applying the New Approach to Charter Claims of Unreasonable Delay” (2017) 
22 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 22 [hereinafter “Sherrin”]. 
83 Jordan leaves open a considerable number of questions, not all of which are addressed 
here, and many of which are helpfully canvassed in Sherrin, id.  
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their perceptions of time and their lesser ability to appreciate the connection 
between actions and consequences.84 Under Morin, the section 11(b) test 
was identical for young persons and adults, but it was applied in light of  
the increased prejudice experienced by youth awaiting trial.85 Now that 
prejudice is no longer a factor, it remains to be seen whether and how  
the Jordan framework will be adapted to account for the particularities  
of young offenders.86  
Likewise, the exclusion of prejudice from the analysis raises 
questions about corporate defendants. In R. v. CIP Inc., the Court held 
that prejudice could not be presumed or inferred in the case of corporate 
defendants since the latter cannot logically claim their liberty or security 
of the person was harmed by delay.87 (Corporate defendants were, 
however, permitted to demonstrate actual impairment to their ability to 
make full answer and defence.88) The Jordan ceiling is calibrated to 
reflect presumed prejudice to liberty and security of person interests. As 
such, one could argue that the ceiling should be raised for corporate 
defendants who do not experience these harms. This possibility was 
neither addressed nor identified in Jordan and so remains open for 
contestation, although it seems the few courts that have considered it to 
date have applied the Jordan ceiling to corporations without modification.89 
More importantly, the removal of prejudice from the analysis creates 
perverse incentives for criminal justice actors, in particular Crowns. With 
that, we return to the question of how Jordan is likely to play out in 
practice. When exercising their discretion to decide whether and how to 
conduct prosecutions, Crowns are likely to be influenced by the fact that 
prejudice is no longer a factor in the section 11(b) analysis. If actual 
prejudice remained an explicit factor, then Crowns would be incentivized to 
prioritize cases where accused persons faced greater prejudice since those 
cases would be at heightened risk of being stayed. In particular, they would 
be incentivized to press ahead in cases where the accused was awaiting trial 
in custody or under especially restrictive bail conditions. The same goes for 
                                                                                                                       
84 See esp. R. v. M. (G.C.), [1991] O.J. No. 885, 3 O.R. (3d) 223 (Ont. C.A.). 
85 J.M., supra, note 9, at paras. 113-124. 
86 See Judge W. Gorman, “R. v. Jordan: It’s Effects on Cases Already in the System” 
(2017) 64 C.L.Q. 240. 
87 [1992] S.C.J. No. 34, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 843, 860-61 (S.C.C.).  
88 Id., at 863. 
89 See, e.g., R. v. Live Nation Canada Inc., [2016] O.J. No. 6591, 2016 ONCJ 735, at paras. 5-13 
(Ont. C.J.); Ontario (Ministry of Labour) v. Sterling Crane Division of Procrane Inc., [2016] O.J. No. 
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other institutional actors who have a hand in scheduling trials: they too 
would be incentivized to allocate earlier trial dates to accused persons on 
remand or under restrictive bail conditions. Further, Crowns would be 
motivated to think carefully about whether to oppose release or to request 
restrictive bail conditions in the first place, knowing that by doing so, they 
would effectively lessen the amount of time on the clock. 
Inasmuch as actual prejudice is not an explicit factor under Jordan, 
Crowns and other officials are not working under these incentives. 
Instead, they are incentivized to move forward with older cases first, 
knowing that the ceiling is the same in all cases regardless of prejudice to 
the accused. Concretely, this means that if Axel is awaiting his provincial 
court trial and has already spent 10 months in a notoriously overcrowded 
jail, while Buster is awaiting his provincial court trial and has been out 
under minimally restrictive conditions for 15 months, then the Crown 
and court officials will be incentivized to move forward with Buster’s 
trial ahead of Axel’s. The Crown will also have less reason to accede to 
Axel’s motion for pre-trial release. More generally, in regions where 
cases have been routinely wrapping up before the 18- or 30-month mark, 
Crowns could now pump the brakes, confident that section 11(b) 
applications are unlikely to succeed before the ceiling is reached.90 
These incentive structures work against the interests of justice. 
Although severe restrictions on liberty are by no means the only harm 
associated with trial delay, they are real and serious, and they are easy to 
predict and track. Conditions in pre-trial custody are notoriously awful: 
“an accused placed in remand is often subjected to the worst aspects of 
our correctional system by being detained in dilapidated overcrowded 
cells without access to recreational or educational programs.”91 For 
people awaiting trial under these conditions, the hours are indeed long.92 
Those held in pre-trial custody are more likely to plead guilty, to be 
convicted at trial, and to receive heavier sentences.93 In light of the 
elevated prejudice that is consistently experienced by accused persons 
held on remand, it would have been better had the Jordan court either 
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retained actual prejudice as an explicit factor in the analysis or set a 
lower ceiling for accused persons awaiting trial in custody (and perhaps 
for those awaiting trial under highly restrictive bail conditions). While 
the latter approach would not account for all forms of prejudice, it would 
promote better incentives for Crowns and court officials while maintaining 
the relative simplicity and uniformity sought by Jordan.94  
A further proposal, which would import additional complexity into the 
framework but would promote even better incentive structures, would be to 
adopt a strong or even irrebuttable presumption that an accused person’s 
section 11(b) right has been violated once she has spent more time in pre-
trial custody than she could reasonably expect to spend in prison if 
ultimately convicted. Such a presumption would address the perverse fact 
that, for some accused persons, a guilty plea can actually result in a better 
outcome than an acquittal. One such accused, Tassandra Whyte, recently 
brought a successful application for bail review in which she argued that 
the amount of time she was predicted to spend in pre-trial custody would 
exceed the maximum sentence she would receive if convicted at trial.95 
By the time the bail review decision was released, she had already spent 
nearly two-and-a-half years in custody awaiting trial for a charge that 
carried an anticipated penalty of three years, and her trial was not 
scheduled to begin for at least another year. The Crown attorney in the 
case agreed that if she were to plead guilty immediately, Whyte would 
likely be released on the basis of time served.  
It is easy to see why a person in Whyte’s circumstances might take 
the plea, whether or not she was guilty. As one defence attorney noted,  
                                                                                                                       
94 In his concurrence, Cromwell J. suggested something along these lines. In his view, 
actual prejudice, especially “being detained in custody or subject to very restrictive bail conditions 
pending trial” should be  
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...People don’t want to sit in jail to get their day in court and be 
vindicated. They would rather have their freedom. 96  
This perverse incentive structure undermines the criminal justice 
system’s truth-seeking and justice-promoting functions. It should be 
eliminated. Were the Jordan ceiling uniformly lowered for accused 
persons held in custody, and were it applied in light of an additional 
presumption that delay is unreasonable if the accused spends more time 
in pre-trial detention than she could expect to serve post-conviction, then 
the incentives for institutional actors would improve.  
In sum, the decision to remove prejudice from the section 11(b) 
framework opens up areas of dispute and contestation while foreclosing 
lines of argumentation that would have resulted in better incentives for 
Crowns and other institutional actors. While we must wait and see how 
Jordan plays out, particularly after the end of the transitional period, 
these incentives, together with concerns about how the ceiling was 
calibrated, suggest the results are likely to be mixed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Section 11(b) contemplates a delicate balance between speed-up and 
delay — one that allows for both thorough, satisfactory processes and 
timely case resolution. The appropriate balance would be hard to strike in 
a well-resourced system. In our chronically underfunded system, it seems 
unachievable. And yet, the Charter demands that we try. About a quarter-
century after the Askov debacle, the Supreme Court has tried once again 
to create a workable section 11(b) test.  
Despite its shortcomings, the Jordan decision should be applauded for 
unequivocally condemning the culture of delay and complacency that 
had settled on our criminal justice system like a thick layer of dust. Read 
together with the subsequent Cody decision,97 Jordan sends a strong 
message that unreasonable delay is not to be tolerated and that all 
institutional actors share a responsibility for preventing it. As Coughlan 
observes, any new section 11(b) approach necessarily had to be 
“superimposed on a system which has spent a quarter-century being 
                                                                                                                       
96 Human Rights Watch, “The Price of Freedom: Bail and Pretrial Detention of Low Income 
Nonfelony Defendants in New York City” (2010) at 32, online: <http://www.hrw.org/sites/ 
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unsympathetic to delay claims. Given the reality into which the new rules 
must be introduced, one can have sympathy for the majority’s view that 
nothing but grabbing the system by the scruff of the neck and shaking it 
is likely to work.”98 It remains to be seen whether Jordan will indeed 
prompt effective reform, but if it fails it will not be for lack of trying. 
Ultimately, however Jordan plays out, section 11(b) will continue to 
vex us. The possibility that we will ever achieve the ideal balance 
between speed-up and delay is even more remote than the possibility that 
the criminal justice system will cease to face resource limitations. Yet, 
while the ideal balance may be unreachable, improvement is not. And if 
we are to improve, we must begin by repudiating the belief that lengthy 
delay is either inevitable or acceptable, and by affirming that it is 
intrinsically prejudicial. The Jordan majority has done that much at 
least.99 In this respect, its reasons call to mind the first lines of Waiting 
for Godot; a play that, rather fittingly, is at least superficially about 
unreasonable delay.100 One of the protagonists, Estragon, opens the play 
by declaring: “Nothing to be done.” His interlocutor, Vladimir, replies: 
“I’m beginning to come round to that opinion. All my life I’ve tried to 
put it from me, saying Vladimir, be reasonable, you haven’t yet tried 
everything. And I resumed the struggle.”101 
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